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Table-Top Exercise: Prince Rupert
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| Alaska Marine Highway System | Holland America Line Westours |
| BC Ambulance Service (BCAS) | Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) |
| BC Coast Pilots | National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS) |
| British Columbia Ferry Services | Pacific Pilotage Authority |
| Canada Customs | Parks Canada - Gwaii Haanas (PCA) |
| Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) | Prince Rupert Fire Department (PRFD) |
| Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary (CCGA) | Prince Rupert Port Authority (PRPA) |
| Canadian Coast Guard Helicopters | Princess Cruises |
| Citizenship and Immigration Canada | Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) |
| Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) | Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) |
| Department of National Defence (DND) | Transport Canada (TC) |
| Emergency Social Services (ESS) | Transportation Safety Board (TSB) |
| United States Coast Guard (USCG) |
Some of the key overall objectives of the exercise were:
As this was a Table-top exercise, participants described the series of actions that their agencies would take in an actual emergency situation. The main objective of the exercise was to understand each others' roles, responsibilities and concerns.
MCTS would get as much information as possible about the vessel, such as position, description etc. Then, as there would most likely be a significant amount of marine traffic in the area, the MCTS operator would issue a marine broadcast alerting resources in the area as to the location of the stricken vessel and request the ETA on-scene of any vessel of opportunity. MCTS would also advise JRCC Victoria and await further instructions from them. The Fire Department would also be contacted immediately. It was estimated that these activities would probably take about five minutes.
JRCC would confirm with MCTS that all available vessels had been tasked to respond and would also determine what kind of lifesaving equipment was on board the stricken vessel. Prince Rupert CCG would call in the off duty crew and contact would be made with the CCG duty pilot. Various CCG and CCGA vessels (the Point Henry and the Rainbow Responder) would be tasked on-scene. JRCC would appoint the vessel Point Henry as the On-Scene Commander, and it would be used as a communications platform, not for evacuation of casualties/passengers. The ferry "Queen of Prince Rupert" could be used for evacuating liferafts, except in the case of inclement weather.
JRCC would also task 442 Squadron in Comox to augment whatever on-scene
resources would be responding.
The USCG stations at Sitka, Juneau and Ketchikan and BC PEP would be contacted
immediately, as would the Maritime Ops Centre and the Admiral at JRCC,
who would invoke the Major Maritime Disaster Response Plan. The Unified
Command Centre would also be put in place at this time and 1 CAD in Winnipeg
would also be notified of the situation. The USCG would be requested to
contact the Alaska Marine Highway System.
The cruise ship Duty Officer would be contacted by satellite phone, and an Incident Command System would be established in the company's head office. A logistical team would be dispatched to Prince Rupert, and arrangements would be made to charter an aircraft to evacuate passengers, if required. A core crew, including firefighters, would be left on board, and a shore-side command centre would be set up. The cruise line would also issue a press release immediately following the incident.
BCAS would be contacted by their dispatch centre, and the Unit Chief would be communicating with the vessel Port Henry. BCAS would also contact the hospital and BC PEP for coordination.
ESS would be responsible for ensuring that those passengers not requiring hospitalization had somewhere to stay. They would set up an on-shore Emergency Centre to assist in whatever capacity was required. ESS would also register people and keep track of who was sent where.
BC PEP would require a detailed list of passengers, including how many, what types of injuries had been sustained, etc. They would set up a reception centre and match people's names against the passenger manifest, as well as work closely with Canada Customs. They would also liaise with the cruise line company.
The RCMP would do their own assessment of the situation, using information gathered by the other agencies involved in the rescue. They would identify the vessel's nationality and its last port of call (Immigration/Customs would also need this information). They may decide to call on resources from neighbouring communities, such as Terrace or Prince George. An RCMP helicopter, capable of carrying 10 passengers, could be tasked to evacuate the more seriously injured, if required, and the RCMP vessel Inkster could carry up to 50 people. Also of interest to the RCMP is whether there is a criminal element involved in the accident (terrorism, arson etc.). They would maintain security aboard the vessel. The RCMP dive team would also be put on standby and a media representative would be at the disembarkation point. The RCMP would also have someone standing by at the hospital and a media liaison person on site to respond to questions.
CCRA should be notified almost immediately. They, too, would require a list of passengers and crew and would need a central location to process the information/people.
The TSB would have to interview crew members as soon as possible after the incident. This would be the extent of their involvement.
In a real emergency, an NOC in Ottawa would likely be put to use in order to brief Ministers and keep the media informed. The NSS is presently researching different federal department sites in Ottawa to ascertain which site would be the most accessible and available.
Since communications are the most common complaint in large-scale SAR operations, MCTS should call in extra operators and pick a dedicated frequency for on-scene communications. An INMARSAT link should also be established between the stricken vessel, JRCC and ESS to that they would all be linked throughout the incident.
The Red Cross, ships' agents, local tug companies and Industry Canada should have been invited to the exercise.
This Table-top exercise was a valuable learning tool as it allowed participants to gain a clearer understanding of each others' roles and responsibilities. This will hopefully alleviate some confusion and duplication of effort that might take place during an actual emergency.
The National SAR Secretariat is hoping to initiate and facilitate more Table-top and "Live" exercises such as this in future.
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